We develop two hypotheses to study merger bonuses provided to target CEOs during acquisitions: the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis and the low-synergy-target hypothesis. The first argues that bonuses indicate agency problems, with target CEOs sacrificing takeover premiums for personal gain. The alternative views bonuses as efficient CEO compensation when takeovers generate small gains. Consistent with both hypotheses, targets dispensing merger bonuses earn 3.89% lower premiums. However, merger announcement returns to acquirers when bonuses occur are indistinguishable from the returns to other bidders. Combined, these findings indicate that in deals where target CEOs get merger bonuses, bidders pay less to buy the target but they also get less in the form of low synergies.
Introduction
On October 18, 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) unanimously approved amendments to Rule 14d-10(a)(2) (commonly known as the "best price" rule) applicable to tender offers for securities registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
This rule was originally written to ensure equal treatment among target shareholders by requiring the highest consideration paid to any one security holder in a class be the consideration paid to all security holders in the same class. The new amendments expressly state that the best price rule does not apply to payments to top managers, directors, or other employees of a target company entered into in connection with an acquisition of the target. The amendments enable the compensation committee of a target's board of directors to approve cash bonuses, severance, or other employee benefit arrangements for its executives during an acquisition negotiation.
The new regulation affecting payments to target executives during acquisitions raises the question of whether these arrangements benefit target shareholders or benefit only target managers. Empirical studies in corporate finance address this matter. For example, Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) show that target managers often have their golden parachutes increased and obtain other personal benefits as part of an acquisition agreement. They question whether these special inducements represent rent extraction by target managers or instead are part of an efficient pay package. Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) find that when target CEOs get a combination of special benefits (through employment relationships, parachute increases, or bonuses), target shareholders receive lower premiums. This finding suggests an answer to the question: rent extraction appears to dominate the efficiency explanation. Target managers seem willing to accept smaller takeover premiums if they personally are given enough extraordinary benefits.
There is some precedent in the academic literature suggesting that there are important facts to be learned about the takeover process and the role of target managers' incentives by evaluating their merger-related benefits separately. For example, Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) find that acquisition premiums paid to target shareholders are lower whenever target CEOs obtain a benefits package which may include a job in the merged firm. In contrast, Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2010) show that such premiums are not lower when the target CEO obtains employment in the bidder firm after the acquisition is completed.
In this paper, we explicitly study merger bonuses to target CEOs, one of several benefits considered by Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) . We develop two hypotheses about the uses of these bonuses -the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis and the low-synergy-target hypothesis.
The self-serving-bargaining hypothesis stems from the interpretation in Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) on the effects of overall merger-related benefits given to target CEOs on takeover outcomes. The self-serving-bargaining hypothesis postulates that the presence of a merger bonus in the set of takeover-related benefits given to target CEOs identifies target firms with severe agency problems. As part of the overall takeover negotiations, acquirers might be willing to negotiate over the merger-related benefits given to target CEOs if, by doing so, they can get away with paying a lower premium to the target shareholders. In these circumstances, poorly monitored and self-serving target CEOs will bargain for a merger bonus to increase their personal wealth at the expense of target shareholders. The fact that bonus payouts are not a function of the takeover price, as for example stock-based payouts would be, will make target CEOs even less sensitive to shareholder wealth considerations than otherwise. Therefore, under the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis, target CEOs that get a bonus in their merger pay package will acquiesce to a low takeover premium for personal gain.
Our alternative view is the low-synergy-target hypothesis. Among target firms using special takeover inducements, different benefit combinations are often part of different types of takeover processes. Under the low-synergy-target hypothesis a merger bonus for the target CEO arises endogenously as part of an efficient benefits package in target firms when their acquisitions are expected to generate inferior gains.
When firms become acquisition targets, their CEOs will want to recover their firm specific human capital investment before agreeing to a takeover.
1 Allowing the CEO to recoup this investment may be efficient for at least two reasons. The first reason arises because managers may be unwilling to invest in firm specific capital if they fear expropriation by the board through a sale of the firm. Establishing a reputation for allowing managers to recoup their human capital during a takeover would therefore be valuable to a merged firm. This idea is consistent with Fama's (1980) ex-post settling up theory. The second efficiency reason for allowing target CEOs to recover their human capital investment is based on the idea that these executives could use their firm-specific knowledge to compete against the acquirer firms. That is, target CEOs have two alternatives available to recoup their firm specific investment upon severance of employment with their firms due to a takeover: getting a monetary payoff such as a merger bonus, or using their firm specific human capital elsewhere in the marketplace. This last alternative often involves direct competition with the acquirer firm. Therefore, in the absence of a merger bonus-type payout where managers recoup their human capital, the effect may be to lower the target firm's value by more than the necessary merger bonus would have cost.
1 CEOs in firms sold for a low premium will have trouble getting future employment (Agrawal and Walkling, 1994) . 2 This point is discussed more generally in Knoeber (1986) .
In target companies likely to produce low synergies with any acquirer, a small premium is the best that target CEOs will be able to get. Because the premium paid for a low-synergy-target is small, the appreciation accruing to equity-based pay will be small. All else equal, an unusually large amount of stock or options might be required to compensate target CEOs for their firmspecific human capital. Therefore, a cash bonus that is not dependent on the takeover price provides a more practical way to help target CEOs recoup their firm specific human capital investment. Moreover, the second efficiency reason described above would predict that such bonuses will be tied to "non-compete" or "consulting" agreements that stop target CEOs from using their firm-specific human capital to compete against the acquirer.
In sum, under the low-synergy-target hypothesis, a merger bonus enables target CEOs to recover their firm specific human capital investment and provides an incentive for the target CEO not to compete with the merged firm. Under these circumstances, the merger bonus benefits target shareholders by making the potential overall value gain from the acquisition as large as possible. In this sense, a merger bonus aligns the incentives of target CEOs and target shareholders even when takeover premiums are likely to be low.
The two hypotheses we examine have some similar empirical predictions. Both the selfserving-bargaining hypothesis and the low-synergy-target hypothesis predict that target firms with merger bonuses are, for example, more likely to have proposed deals completed, and more likely to get lower premiums when the deals are completed.
Our main focus in this paper, however, is on the predictions that are different. The key different prediction is about the extent of acquirer gains from the merger. Under the self-servingbargaining hypothesis, target CEOs do not negotiate hard with the acquirer over premiums when merger bonuses exist, and the acquirer gets away with paying too little. This implies that the acquirer should reap larger acquisition gains when there are target merger bonuses. While the low-synergy-target hypothesis also suggests lower target premiums when there are bonuses, the reason for the lower premium is lower overall synergies. In this case, there should be no difference between the gains to the acquirer when merger bonuses are present.
We test our hypotheses about merger bonuses for target CEOs in a sample of 949 publicly traded targets that receive an acquisition bid during 1999-2009. Our results indicate that a merger bonus encourages target CEOs to sell their firms: deals involving this benefit are about 5.13
percentage points more likely to be completed. Given that the unconditional probability of completion for deals in our sample is 81.6%, this finding indicates that bonuses have a nontrivial effect on the likelihood that a merger materializes. We find that in deals in which the target CEO gets a merger bonus, targets get premiums about 3.89 percentage points lower.
However, we do not detect a transfer of wealth to bidder shareholders from target shareholders in transactions in which target CEOs get a merger bonus. The lack of larger bidder wealth gains is inconsistent with the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis. Our findings suggest that the lower premiums associated with merger bonuses occur because there are lower overall gains from the takeover. Therefore, our results support the low-synergy-target hypothesis of merger bonuses.
The dispute between the low-synergy-target hypothesis and the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis for why premiums are lower where bonuses exist is basically one of endogeneity and selection bias. That is, the low-synergy-target hypothesis holds that low synergies lead to both bonuses and low premiums; the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis instead argues that bonuses lead to low premiums because of agency problems. To control for selection bias, when appropriate, our tests use the Heckman (1979) procedure. However, it is possible that alternative endogeneity controls may be necessary. Therefore, we use a simultaneous equation methodology (Maddala, 1983) in which both the bonus and the merger synergy enter as endogenous variables.
The results of this test indicate that causality runs in both directions: low-synergy-targets are more likely to give their CEOs a merger bonus and targets that include a bonus in the set of merger-related benefits to their CEOs earn lower premiums. While the simultaneous equation results thus provide some limited support for the self-serving bargaining hypothesis, they also confirm the idea that in low synergy targets bonuses arise endogenously.
Our findings add to the public policy debate about recent changes in securities laws that now allow target firms to give bonuses and other benefits to their executives during takeovers. More importantly, our study expands the existing research on merger-related benefits given to CEOs that sell their firms. Other studies find that premiums are lower when target CEOs get a mix of special merger-related benefits (Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack, 2004) , when target CEOs are hired by the acquirer (Wulf, 2004) , or when they get unscheduled options during merger negotiations (Fich, Cai, and Tran, 2011) . All of these papers conclude that such benefits lead target CEOs to sacrifice merger premiums for personal gain -consistent with the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis. We also find that targets earn lower premiums when they award their CEOs a merger bonus. However, in contrast with the existing literature, we do not find that target CEOs that receive a bonus compromise the wealth of their shareholders. Instead, we show that such bonuses can be a part of an optimal exit-pay arrangement for CEOs that sell their firms, especially when they head firms that provide low synergies. Our findings on bonuses demonstrate that examining specific components of the merger pay package to target CEOs explains critical facts about the deal and about the effect of those particular benefits.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data and the merger bonuses awarded to target CEOs. Section 3 presents our empirical analyses. Section 4 contains additional tests.
Section 5 concludes.
Data and variable definitions
In this section, we provide descriptive statistics for the sample we use and present information related to the merger bonuses given to target CEOs in the transactions we study.
Acquisition sample
We begin with 4,455 merger and acquisition (M&A) bids tracked by the Securities Data
Company (SDC) announced during [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] in which the target is a publicly traded U.S.
company. This initial sample excludes spinoffs, recapitalizations, exchange offers, repurchases, self-tenders, privatizations, acquisitions of remaining interest, partial interests or assets, and transactions for which deal value is not disclosed. We retain 3,807 deals in which targets have stock market and accounting data available from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, respectively. We drop 324 bids for which we cannot obtain acquisition premium data from SDC or other sources. We also require corporate governance data for the target company from RiskMetrics, deal background and target CEO exit compensation arrangement information from the merger proxy filed by the target and/or acquirer with the SEC or from news event searches in Lexis/Nexis. These criteria yield our final sample of 949 deals.
In Panel A of Table 1 , we report the temporal and industrial distribution of the 949 sample targets. The industrial distribution of our targets, which follows the classification in Fama and French (1997) , mirrors the industrial distribution of targets in SDC during our sample period. 3 In addition, the annual number of mergers announced is higher at the beginning of our sample period, which coincides with times of economic expansion. Also, the incidence of mergers We find that 89% of transactions in our sample consist of friendly mergers. This frequency also resembles that in Bates and Lemmon (2003) .
We read the S-4, DEFM 14, SC 14D9, SC TO, DEF 14, and 8-K filed by the acquirer and/or target firms with the SEC and find that in over 36% of our transactions, the target firm initiates the deal. This incidence is similar to that of 42% reported in the sample of deals occurring during 1994-2006 studied by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010) . The bidder is from the same Fama and French (1997) industry as the target in 54% of our sample, which is comparable to that of 52% in Officer (2003) . Deals in our sample exhibit an average value of $4.611 billion. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) also report a large mean deal value of $4.7 billion for transactions in their sample of acquisitions during 1993-1999. For the same ratio, Bates and Lemmon (2003) report a mean value of 0.233 for the targets they study. Overall, the descriptive statistics of deals and targets in our sample appear in line with those reported in the previous literature.
Merger bonus
We also read the different merger-related filings by either the target or the acquirer with the SEC to identify whether the target firm awards its CEO a merger bonus. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics related to merger bonuses given to target CEOs in the deals we study.
According to the information in Panel A of Table 2 , 219 target CEOs (or about 23%) receive a merger bonus. 4 Within this group, 29 CEOs have a merger bonus clause in their compensation contract when they are first hired by the target firm. We categorize the description given for the merger bonus in the proxy filings and report this information in Panel B of Table 2 . Most target boards justify these payments as "consulting" fees (59 cases), "noncompetition" agreements (41 cases), "signing" consents (6 cases) or "management" (1 case) as required by the buyer. Other target firms categorize these payments as "retention" (58 cases), "special" (8 cases), "stay" (3 cases), "termination" (6 cases), "transition" (2 cases) or "separation" (1 case) made in consideration of the annulment of the CEO's employment agreement. The remaining boards award these payments in order to recognize the target CEO's leadership in executing the transaction. In these instances, the payments are described as "bonus" (20 cases), "merger" (17 cases), "transaction" (11 cases), or "special recognition" (1 case). 5 We note that the incidence of "non-compete" and "consulting" descriptions for the merger bonus might be consistent with the rationale in the low-synergy-target hypothesis that this benefit is given to target CEOs to prevent them from competing against the acquirer.
For the 219 cases in which the target CEO is awarded a merger bonus, we report summary statistics of the cash paid for this benefit. This information appears in Panel C of Table 2 .
Relative to the median transaction value for deals in our sample (over $1.5 billion), merger bonuses appear to be quite modest. On average, these payments amount to about $1.6 million with a maximum value of $12 million.
Empirical analyses
In order to distinguish among our hypotheses, we perform several tests aimed at examining the causes and consequences of merger bonuses awarded to target CEOs.
Why do target firms give their CEO a merger bonus?
To explore the characteristics of targets that provide a merger bonus in our sample of 949 targets, we run three regressions of the determinants of these benefits and report the results in Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) , is set to one whenever the CEO has been in office longer than the majority of the members in the compensation committee. The results in Table 3 indicate that target CEOs are 6.60 percentage points more likely to get a merger bonus when the compensation committee is handpicked. 6 The dependent variable in models (2) and (3) is equal to zero if the target CEO does not a get a merger bonus. 7 We also scale the bonus by the target's market value of equity. All results continue to obtain with this variable. 8 We calculate the marginal effects as follows. First, we estimate the probability of having a merger bonus using zeros for all bivariate independent variables and using the sample means for all continuous independent variables. Second, we recalculate that probability by changing the value of the independent variable of interest one at a time.
We use a one instead of a zero for each bivariate variable and add one standard deviation to the mean of each continuous variable. Finally, the marginal effect is the difference between the recalculated and base probability. It shows the change in probability of having a merger bonus resulting from a change from zero to one for each bivariate independent variable or from a one standard deviation change for each continuous independent variable. We use the same procedure to calculate the marginal effects for all binary response models in this paper. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) argue that poorly performing targets will create low synergies in equilibrium. Our low-synergy-target hypothesis predicts that bonus payments should be more prevalent in low quality targets. Perhaps consistent with this prediction, according to all models in Table 3 , merger bonuses are more likely to occur in firms that underperform (in terms of return on assets (ROA)) during the year prior to the acquisition bid. 9 With regard to the economic effect related to the coefficient estimate in model (1), a one percentage point decrease in ROA increases the probability of getting a bonus by 0.81 percentage points. This increase in probability is noteworthy given that the incidence of merger bonuses in our sample is 23%. Hansen (1987) argues that acquirers are more likely to use stock (instead of cash) to buy a target when the prospects of the deal are rather uncertain. He maintains that the use of stock forces target shareholders to share in the risk of the merger. Following this logic, it is possible that deals involving a low synergy target have a more uncertain outcome. If this is the case, mergers in which the target CEO gets a bonus should be less likely to be structured as all-cash deals and more likely to involve the bidders' stock. Possibly consistent with this conjecture, the results in Table 3 document an inverse association between the Cash payment (0,1) indicator and all of our bonus proxies. According to the estimates in model (1), the probability of getting a merger bonus decreases by 10.93 percentage points when the transaction is structured as an all cash deal.
In a theoretical study about golden parachutes, Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) view parachutes as implicit deferred compensation, already earned but not yet received, that promotes managerial human capital investment in the firm. Our low-synergy-target hypothesis suggests that the merger bonus helps target CEOs recoup their firm specific human capital investment.
9 Using average stock returns and average ROA over the three year period before the merger yields qualitatively similar results.
Perhaps in line with both theories, we note that Table 3 documents an inverse and statistically significant association between bonuses and parachute provisions: merger bonuses and golden parachutes are substitutes. The estimates in model (1) of Table 3 imply that a drop of one standard deviation in parachute value increases the probability of a bonus by 1.39 percentage points. According to model (2), a $1 decline in the parachute payment raises the bonus by $0.63.
The low-synergy-target hypothesis conjectures that a merger bonus provides an incentive for the target CEO not to compete against the merged firm. Therefore, in Table 3 , we control for whether non-competition agreements are enforceable in the state in which the acquisition takes place with a variable based on the index proposed by Garmaise (2011) . 10 Notably, according to model (1), an increase of one unit in the non-compete index (i.e. less enforceability) is associated with a 1.68 percentage point decline in the probability that the target CEO gets a merger bonus.
The results in our merger bonus determinant tests support both the low-synergy-target hypothesis and the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis. To better test these hypotheses, we proceed with an analysis of the effect of merger bonuses to target CEOs on the wealth of target and acquirer shareholders.
Merger bonus and deal completion
Both the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis and the low-synergy-target hypothesis predict that merger bonuses will increase the probability of deal completion. To investigate this issue, in Table 4 , we use our entire sample of 949 acquisition bids to estimate three dichotomous logit models in which the dependent variable is one if the acquisition materializes and is zero 10 Garmaise proposes an enforceability index which is based on 12 questions analyzed by Malsberger (2004) . For each jurisdiction, Garmaise assigns 1 point for each question if the jurisdiction's enforcement of that dimension of noncompetition law exceeds a given threshold. Possible totals therefore range from 0 to 12 where a higher value denotes a higher level of enforceability. We transform the index to interpret it as measuring non-enforceability (instead of enforceability) where higher values of the index denote less enforceability.
otherwise. The main independent variables are a dummy set to one if the target awards a merger bonus to its CEO in model (1), the natural logarithm of the dollar value of the merger bonus in model (2) and the scaled bonus in model (3). Control variables in the deal completion regressions, which we define in the legend of Table 4 , are similar to those employed in Officer (2003) and in Bates and Lemmon (2003) . Those papers also examine the probability of merger completion. All tests control for industry and year fixed effects as well as for endogenous selfselection using the inverse Mill's ratio (Heckman, 1979) .
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The results in all models of Table 4 show a positive and significant association between our three proxies for the bonus and deal completion. In fact, merger bonuses appear to have a nontrivial effect on deal completion. The estimates in model (1) imply that deals in which targets award a merger bonus to their CEOs are 5.13 percentage points more likely to be completed.
Other results in Table 4 are in agreement with those in previous studies. Walkling (1985) , Comment and Schwert (1995), and Schwert (2000) argue that deal attitude is crucial for mergers to be completed. In our sample, deals classified as hostile are almost 40 percentage points less likely to be completed. As in Bates and Lemmon (2003) , we also find that deals with a target termination fee are more likely to materialize.
Overall, the estimates in Table 4 indicate that a merger bonus enhances the probability that the acquisition occurs. This effect could be, as in the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis, because target CEOs that get a bonus in their merger pay package will consent to a deal to receive these benefits. Or it could be, as in the low-synergy-target hypothesis, because the merger bonus 11 Because the results in Table 3 indicate that granting a merger bonus has its own determinants, in Table 4 we control for endogenous self-selection using the inverse Mill's ratio (Heckman, 1979) . The Heckman self-selectivity correction involves a first-stage estimation of the probability of granting a merger bonus as in model (1) of Table 3 . In the second stage, the inverse Mill's ratio from the first-stage model is included in the estimation as a variable to control for endogenous self-selection.
encourages the CEO to support the deal by providing compensation for human capital. Next, to study this issue in more depth, we examine the wealth effects associated with the merger bonus.
Merger bonus and acquisition premiums
In Table 5 , we estimate three regressions with year-and industry-fixed effects using the fourweek premium reported by SDC as the dependent variable. 12 Our target premium tests closely follow the specification in Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2008) . In model (1), the main independent is a (0,1) indicator set to one if the target CEO receives a merger bonus. The indicator is set to zero otherwise. In model (2), we use the natural logarithm of the merger bonus payment as the key explanatory variable. In model (3), the independent variable of interest is the scaled bonus. Because target firms can choose whether to offer a merger bonus, all regressions control for self-selection using the Heckman (1979) correction. The legend accompanying Table   5 provides the definition for all other control variables.
We note that the estimates for several control variables in Table 5 are in agreement with the existing M&A literature. For example, we find acquisition premiums to be higher in deals characterized as tender offers (Huang and Walkling, 1987) . Premiums also increase with the existence of a target termination fee (Bates and Lemmon, 2003, and Officer, 2003) . In contrast, acquisition premiums are inversely related to the size of the target firm, also decline when the bidder is a private company (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter, 2008) , and when the transaction is characterized as a merger of equals (Wulf, 2004, and Wang and Xie, 2009 ).
The merger bonus coefficients in all models of Table 5 document an economically important inverse association between this benefit and takeover premiums. According to the estimates in model (1), the presence of a bonus is associated with a decline in premium of 3.89 percentage points. Such a decline implies a drop of about $186 million in terms of deal value. Similarly, according to the estimates in model (2), every $1 increase in the merger bonus lowers deal value by about $11. Thus, although the merger bonus is quite small relative to the average deal size it is associated with a disproportionately large premium decline.
At first glance, these results suggest that target CEOs that receive a merger bonus sacrifice substantial shareholder wealth for personal gain. This finding is consistent with the interpretation in Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004) and the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis. However, as mentioned before, this result is also consistent with the low-synergy-target alternative. The next two subsections provide our key tests that help differentiate these hypotheses.
Merger bonus and acquisition synergies
In Table 6 , we estimate three regressions of the acquisition synergies for the 497 transactions in our sample where the bidder is a publicly traded firm. 13 These tests, which include year and industry fixed effects, are similar to those in Wang and Xie (2009). Following Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) , the dependent variable in all models in Table 6 is the total percentage synergistic gain from acquisitions (or merger synergy). We compute this variable as the three day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target around the merger announcement date. 14 The main independent variable in model (1) is a (0,1) indicator set to one if the target awards a merger bonus to its CEO. The main independent variable in model (2) is the natural logarithm of the merger bonus value. The scaled bonus is the key explanatory variable in model (3).The legend accompanying Table 6 details the remaining control variables.
The estimates related to our control variables in Table 6 yield results that are consistent with the existing literature. For example, the inferences related to statistically significant variables such as shareholder-rights difference, bidder size, cash payment (0,1), and merger of equals (0,1) are similar to those in Wang and Xie (2009). The results associated with our key independent variables document an inverse association between all of our proxies for the merger bonus and the synergy gains. According to the estimate in model (1), the presence of a bonus is associated with a 1.45% decline in synergies or a drop of about $507 million. This finding is consistent with the low-synergy-target hypothesis. It is not necessarily inconsistent, however, with the selfserving-bargaining hypothesis, which has no prediction about an association between merger bonuses and synergies.
The low synergy associated with bonuses, coupled with our earlier finding of low premiums, suggests two possibilities. One, consistent with the low-synergy-target hypothesis, is that bonuses are given when targets have low synergies, and these lead to low premiums but no extraordinary wealth gain to acquirers. The other, consistent with the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis, is that bonuses lead to extraordinary acquirer wealth gains even though the synergies are low. In this view, low synergies may lead to low premiums, but the self-interest of the target CEO makes the premium even lower where there are bonuses. Consequently, an analysis of the acquisition returns to the bidders should help in differentiating between our hypotheses.
Merger bonus and acquirer returns
To analyze the possible effect of merger bonuses on acquirer returns, we use the standard event-study methodology to estimate the three-day market model-adjusted CAR centered on the announcement of the acquisition and accruing to the 497 publicly traded buyers in our sample.
This CAR is calculated as the residual from the market model estimated during the one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement. Models (1), (2), and (3) of Table   7 consist of three ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions using this CAR as the dependent variable. The key independent variable in model (1) is a (0,1) dummy set to one if the target awards a merger bonus to its CEO and set to zero otherwise. The independent variables of interest in models (2) and (3) Table 7 provides the definition for these variables.
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The estimates of the merger bonus variables in the first three models of Table 7 are not statistically significant. Furthermore, the coefficients for these variables are negative -the wrong sign for the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis. Nonetheless, it is possible that investors first learn that the target CEO is getting a merger bonus when the terms of the deals are made public or the merger proxy is filed but are unaware of this benefit when the deal is announced. This situation could explain why none of our merger bonus proxies in models (1)- (3) of Table 7 attain statistical significance. To address this issue, we calculate the three-day CAR around the date of the merger proxy filing or the date when the existence of the bonus is made public (whichever comes first). 16 We use this CAR as the dependent variables in models (4)-(6) in Table 7 . The key explanatory variables in these regressions are the same as those in models (1)- (3), respectively.
Consistent with the results in models (1)-(3), the estimates related to our bonus proxies are also insignificant and negative in models (4)-(6). So, together with the target premium results, the results in Table 7 show that acquirers of targets that provide their CEOs a merger bonus are paying less for the target but are not capturing rents from the shareholders of the firms they buy.
This is the key result helping to differentiate our hypotheses about bonuses to target CEOs.
The absence of higher acquirer returns where merger bonuses are present suggests that we should reject the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis in favor of the low-synergy-target alternative.
Additional tests
This section describes further analyses performed in order to probe the robustness of the preceding findings.
Acquisition premium alternatives
The tests presented in Table 5 use the four-week premium reported by SDC as the dependent variable. In Table 8 , we re-estimate the Table 5 regressions using three different premium measures. The dependent variable in model (1) is the target's CAR during the window (-20, +1) relative to the announcement date, as in Jarrell and Poulsen (1989). Following Schwert (1996) , the dependent variable in model (2) is the target's CAR during the window (-42, +126). Model (3) uses the "combined" merger premium defined in Officer (2003) (2003), we first estimate a premium based on component data using the aggregate value of cash, stock, and other securities offered by the bidder to target shareholders as reported by SDC. We then estimate premiums based on initial price and final price data, respectively. These prices are also reported by SDC. All premium measures are then deflated by the target's market value 42 trading days prior to the bid announcement. The combined premium is based on the component measure if it is greater than zero and less than two. Otherwise, the premium relies on the initial price measure (or on the final price measure if initial price data are missing).
The results in Table 8 are similar to those in Table 5 and document an inverse association between the use of a merger bonus and the takeover premium. According to the estimates, premiums are 2.98 to 5.01 percentage points lower when these benefits are part of the merger pay package given to target CEOs.
Simultaneous regressions analyses
To control for potential selection bias in the key results presented in Section 3, we use a correction suggested by Heckman (1979) . Nonetheless, we recognize that there are alternative ways to address this bias and test the key prediction of the low-synergy-target hypothesis that the use of a merger bonus is the endogenous result of low synergy. As supplemental tests, we therefore estimate systems of simultaneous equations following the methodology outlined in Maddala (1983).
Endogeneity of the merger bonus and the takeover premium
We estimate a system of simultaneous equations in which the takeover premium and the merger bonus enter as the two endogenous variables. In this system, the merger bonus and premium instruments are estimated from first-stage regressions using all of the control variables in the two equations. The second-stage tests consist of (i) an OLS regression of the takeover premium on the merger bonus instrument and (ii) a regression where the dependent variable is the merger bonus and the key independent variable is an instrument for the premium. The standard errors in these regressions are adjusted for the fact that the instrumental variables for the bonus and premium are estimated.
To properly identify the simultaneous system, we must exclude an exogenous variable from each of the two second-stage regression equations. For the merger bonus equation, we must satisfy the relevancy condition with a variable that is correlated with the bonus after controlling for all other exogenous variables. The same variable will satisfy the exclusion restriction if it is uncorrelated with the error term of the second-stage premium regression. For this variable we use the hand-picked compensation committee (0,1) dummy. Table 3 indicates that this variable is significantly related to our merger bonus proxies. Conversely, the estimates in Table 5 indicate that the same variable is unrelated to the premium. For the premium equation, the variable that we use is a (0,1) dummy for whether the target CEO nears retirement. This variable appears to satisfy the relevancy condition and the exclusion restriction. The results in Jenter and Lewellen (2011) and our own estimates in Table 5 show an inverse association between premiums and whether the target CEO nears retirement. However, according to the results in Table 3 , our merger bonus proxies are not a function of whether the target CEO is nearing retirement.
The first four regressions in Table 9 present the simultaneous equations analyses that test for endogeneity between the merger bonus and the takeover premium. After accounting for endogeneity, the merger bonus instrument in the second-stage premium regression is negative and statistically significant. The estimate indicates that the takeover premium is about 3.55
percentage points lower when the target CEO gets a bonus. Likewise, the premium instrument in the second-stage bonus regression is also negative and significant. This result indicates that merger bonuses are more likely to be paid to the target CEO when the target firm earns a lower premium. Consequently, the results of the first system of simultaneous equations indicate that the direction of causality between bid premiums and merger bonuses runs in both directions.
Endogeneity of the merger bonus and synergies
The preceding results indicate that the causality between bonuses and takeover premium runs both ways. This evidence suggests that the use of a merger bonus might be the endogenous result of low synergy. However, the low-synergy-target hypothesis does not predict that low premiums cause bonuses; it instead argues low synergies lead to bonuses. To directly test this, we estimate another system of simultaneous equations in which the merger bonus and the synergy are provided as the two endogenous variables. We note that for this analysis we can only use the 497 deals in our sample where both the target and the acquirer are publicly traded companies. As with the tests in Table 6 , the total percentage merger synergy is the three day CAR accruing to a value-weighted portfolio of the bidder and the target around the merger announcement date.
The last two regressions in Table 9 present our tests for endogeneity of the merger bonus and synergies. 18 To conserve space, we only report the estimates of the second-stage models. The results of the second system of equations document that the direction of causality between the merger bonus and synergies runs in both directions: low-synergy-targets are more likely to give their CEOs a merger bonus and targets that give a bonus to their CEOs earn lower premiums.
This result conforms to the idea that bonuses arise endogenously in low synergy targets.
Conclusions
Recently, the effect of merger-related benefits given to target CEOs on the wealth of target shareholders has garnered considerable academic attention. Research papers in this area show that target shareholders are paid lower premiums when target CEOs get a combination of extraordinary acquisition-induced benefits (Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack, 2004) , when target CEOs receive employment in the merged firm (Wulf, 2004) , or when target CEOs obtain unscheduled options grants during private merger negotiations (Fich, Cai, and Tran, 2011) . A 18 As in the first system of equations in Table 9 , for the merger bonus equation in the second system, we satisfy the relevancy condition and the exclusion restriction with the hand-picked compensation committee (0,1) dummy. For the synergy equation, the variable that we use is a (0,1) indicator for Merger of Equals. This variable appears to satisfy the relevancy condition and the exclusion restriction. The results in Wang and Xie (2009) and those in Tablecommon conclusion that emerges from these studies is that merger-related benefits prompt target
CEOs to neglect the wealth of their shareholders for personal gain.
In this paper, we study the merger bonus provided to CEOs that sell their firms. In order to rationalize this benefit we develop two hypotheses: the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis and the low-synergy-target hypothesis. The first conjectures that a merger bonus indicates agency problems in the target company. In these firms, agency manifests in the form of self-serving target CEOs bargaining over their personal merger-related benefits at the expense of their shareholders. Hence, under the self-serving-bargaining hypothesis the effect of a bonus is similar to the other benefits documented in the literature: it leads target CEOs to sell out their shareholders for their own personal gain. In contrast, the low-synergy-target alternative proposes that, as part of an efficient merger pay package, bonuses help target CEOs recoup their human capital investment and deter them from competing against the merged firm. Therefore, the lowsynergy-target hypothesis predicts that the bonus identifies cases in which the incentives of target CEOs and target shareholders are aligned even when low synergies and small takeover premiums are likely.
Both our hypotheses predict that the presence of a merger bonus will be associated with an increased probability of deal completion and with inferior takeover premiums. These predictions are borne out by our data: transactions in which the target CEO gets a bonus are 5.13 percentage points more likely to be completed and exhibit a 3.89 percentage points lower premium.
To distinguish between our hypotheses of the merger bonus to target CEOs, we study the synergistic gains associated with the acquisition. This analysis shows that deals involving targets with merger bonuses generate lower synergy gains. While this result is consistent with the lowsynergy-target hypothesis, it does not conclusively support it. Therefore, we also estimate and examine bidder returns upon the merger announcement. This test shows that returns to acquirers of targets that give their CEOs a bonus are indistinguishable from or lower than the returns accruing to other bidders. Consequently, this result together with the evidence of our target premium test indicates that bidders of targets with merger bonuses pay less for the targets they purchase but they also get less in the form of low synergy targets. These results are robust to controls for self-selection and to alternative definitions of the takeover premium.
We also estimate a system of simultaneous equations in which the takeover premium and the merger synergy enter as endogenous variables. This analysis reveals that the direction of causality runs in both directions: targets expecting low premiums are more likely to provide their CEOs a bonus and these bonuses are associated with lower synergies. These findings are consistent with the idea that in low synergy targets bonuses arise endogenously.
Notwithstanding the results on merger bonuses, we cannot decisively assess whether these payments are universally beneficial to all target shareholders. Our sample includes bids for targets that are made public. As a result, we cannot identify whether target CEOs decline a merger bonus or other benefits in potential mergers in which a bid is never made public, perhaps to the detriment of their shareholders. Nonetheless, our results suggest that merger bonuses do not hurt target shareholders especially when their companies generate inferior synergies. In this regard, our paper contributes important evidence to the growing literature in corporate finance on how the benefits target CEOs get during mergers affect the wealth of shareholders in the firms involved in the transaction. Our findings also inform the public policy debate about recently promulgated securities laws enabling target firms to approve bonuses and other benefits for their executives during takeovers. More importantly, our results on merger bonuses show that studying individual components of the merger pay package to target CEOs in isolation reveals crucial information about the acquisition process and the objective of specific benefits. Indeed, in contrast with recent evidence related to pre-merger stock options or a job in the merged firm, our results suggest that awarding the target CEO a merger bonus benefits shareholders in firms that become acquisition targets. In Panel B we report deal status, mode of acquisition, method of payment, deal attitude, and deal value. All of these characteristics are obtained from SDC. Information on the sale procedure and the deal initiator is obtained from the merger background section in the proxies filed by the parties to the merger with the SEC. Target initiated (0,1) variable equals one if the target firm first contacts the bidder(s) to initiate the sale process. Same industry deals are those in which the target and the acquirer belong to the same Fama and French (1997) industrial group. All financial variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year before the merger public announcement date. M/B is defined as market value of equity divided by book value of equity. Leverage equals the book value of debt divided by the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity. Prior year market adjusted return is the cumulative abnormal return during the one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement, calculated as the residual from the market model estimated during the year before. Panel A provides a breakdown of our sample deals based on whether the target CEO receives a merger bonus. Panel B shows the number of cases under different terms used by the target board to indicate a merger bonus. We obtain this information by reading the merger proxies, the last annual proxies and other forms before the merger announcement filed by either the target or the acquirer with the SEC (for example, S-4, DEFM 14, SC 14D9, SC TO, DEF 14, 8-K). In Panel C, we report the summary statistics of the merger bonus value for 219 cases in which the target CEO is awarded a merger bonus, and the same value scaled by the target CEO's total compensation during the fiscal year prior to the merger announcement. (3) is the merger bonus value scaled by the target CEO's total compensation during the year prior to the merger announcement. The dependent variable in models (2) and (3) equals zero if the merger bonus is not offered. Golden parachute is the natural logarithm of the estimated lumpsum payment equal to a multiple of the target CEO's salary and bonus prior to the deal. CEO-chairman (0,1) equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board. CEO founder (0,1) equals one if the CEO is among the firm's founders. Overconfident CEO (0,1) is defined as Malmendier and Tate's (2005) longholder measure and follows Hall and Liebman's (1998) option classification procedure. It equals one if the target CEO owns options at the beginning of the last year of the options' life that are at least 40% in the money. CEO near retirement age (0,1) equals one if the CEO is at least 62 years old at the time of the merger announcement. Golden parachute is the natural logarithm of the golden parachute payment estimated for the target CEO before the acquisition. Parachute augmentation (0,1) equals one if the target board increases the parachute value for the target CEO at the time of the acquisition as in Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) . Unscheduled option grant (0,1) equals one if the target CEO receives an unscheduled option award during merger negotiation as in Fich, Cai, and Tran (2011) . Target CEO postdeal employment (0,1) equals one if the target CEO already holds or obtains either a directorship or an executive appointment such as CEO of the acquirer or a subsidiary, chief financial officer, chief operating officer, chairman, vice-chairman, president, or vice-president in the bidder firm after deal completion. In case of withdrawn deals, it equals one if the target CEO already holds any of the positions just described or if the merger proxy states that the target CEO will be employed by the bidder upon deal completion. Size is the natural logarithm of the target market value. The operating cash flow variable is scaled by total assets. ROA is operating income before depreciation divided by the average of beginning-and endingperiod book value of total assets. Prior year return volatility is the standard deviation of returns during the one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement. Entrenchment index is the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) based on six antitakeover provisions tracked by RiskMetrics (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments). Board size is the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board. Independent board (0,1) equals one if at least half of the board's directors are independent. A director is considered independent if s/he is not a current or former employee of the firm or a subsidiary, and is not affiliated with the company as defined by RiskMetrics. Handpicked compensation committee (0,1) equals one if at least half of the compensation committee's directors are appointed after the current CEO is in the chief executive position. CEO equity ownership, board ownership, and institutional ownership are the percentage of equity owned by the CEO, all directors (excluding the CEO), and institutional investors, respectively, as reported in the most recent annual proxy before the merger. We include option holding in the calculation of equity ownership for the CEO. Target termination fee (0,1) equals one if the target has a termination fee provision in the merger contract. Lockup (0,1) equals one if the deal includes a lockup of target or acquirer shares. Prior bidding (0,1) equals one if the deal follows a prior bid within one year. Toehold is the ownership of target common stock by the bidder. Cash payment (0,1) equals one if the deal is paid entirely in cash. Tender offer (0,1) equals one if the form of the deal is tender offer. Regulated industry (0,1) equals one if the target's industry belongs to railroads, trucking, airlines, telecommunications, or gas and electric utilities. Noncompete index is derived from Garmaise (2009)'s enforceability index which measures the enforcement level of non-compete agreements for executives in different U.S. states. We subtract Garmaise's index from its maximum level. Higher non-compete index means less enforceability. Other variables are selfexplanatory or defined elsewhere. All variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year before the merger public announcement date. The sample consists of 949 merger and acquisition bids announced during 1999-2009 described in Table  1 . The dependent variable in the logit models equals one if the proposed merger is ultimately consummated. The main independent variable in models (1), (2), and (3) is the bonus (0,1) indicator, the bonus value, and the scaled bonus, respectively, defined in Table 3 . Other independent variables are similar to those in Bates and Lemmon (2003) and Officer (2003) . Litigation (0,1) equals one if the deal has associated litigation as defined by SDC. Family firm target (0,1) equals one if a family, group of families, firm founder, or non-founding chairman controls more than 20% of the outstanding equity of the target. Deal value is in natural logarithm. The Heckman self-selectivity correction involves a first-stage estimation of the probability of having a merger bonus as in model (2) The sample consists of 949 acquisitions announced during 1999-2009 described in Table 1 . We run OLS premium regressions similar to those in Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2008) . The dependent variable is the acquisition premium as reported by SDC which is calculated as the offer price divided by the target's stock price four weeks before the merger announcement date. The main independent variable in models (1), (2), and (3) is the bonus (0,1) indicator, the bonus value, and the scaled bonus, respectively, defined in Table 3 . As in Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) , target industry liquidity is the liquidity of the market for corporate control for the target firm's industry. This variable is defined as the value of all corporate control transactions for US$1 million or more reported by SDC for each year and industry divided by the total book value of assets of all Compustat firms in the same industry and year. Prior year return volatility is the standard deviation of returns during the one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement. Rumor (0,1) equals one if the deal is rumored as reported in SDC. G index is the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) The dependent variable is the total percentage synergistic gain from acquisitions (or merger synergy), calculated as the three day cumulative abnormal return for a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target around the merger announcement date similar to the method of Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) . The target's weight is adjusted for the bidder's toehold. The main independent variable in models (1), (2), and (3) is the bonus (0,1) indicator, the bonus value, and the scaled bonus, respectively, defined in (2004) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) . The dependent variable in models (1), (2), and (3) is the acquirer's cumulative abnormal return over the three days around the merger announcement date, calculated as the residual from the market model estimated during the one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement. The main independent variable in models (1), (2), and (3) is the bonus (0,1) indicator, the bonus value, and the scaled bonus, respectively, defined in Table 3 . The dependent variable in models (4), (5), and (6) is the acquirer's cumulative abnormal return over the three days around the merger proxy filing date, calculated as the residual from the market model estimated during the one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement. The main independent variable in models (4), (5), and (6) is the bonus (0,1) indicator, the bonus value, and the scaled bonus, respectively, defined in The sample consists of 949 acquisitions announced during 1999-2009 described in Table 1 . We run OLS premium regressions similar to those in Table 5 . The dependent variable in model (1) is the target's cumulative abnormal returns during the window (-20, +1) around the announcement date as in Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) . The dependent variable in model (2) is the target's cumulative abnormal returns during the window (-42, +126) around the announcement date as in Schwert (1996) . The dependent variable in model (3) is the "combined" acquisition premium as in Officer (2003) . Following his approach, we first estimate a premium based on "component" data using the aggregate value of cash, stock, and other securities offered by the bidder to target shareholders as reported by SDC. We then estimate premiums based on "initial price" and "final price" data, respectively. These prices are also reported by SDC. All premium measures are then deflated by the target's market value 42 trading days prior to the bid announcement. The combined premium is based on the component measure if it is greater than 0 and less than 2 (or 200%); otherwise the premium relies on the initial price measure (or on the final price measure if initial price data are missing). The main independent variable is a bonus indicator that is one if the target awards a merger bonus to its CEO. Other variables are self-explanatory or defined elsewhere. The reported p-values are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent. The symbols * , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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